By Lami SADIQ

As the vigilante commander in Zamfara, Rabiu Bawa knows the cost of defending such communities. “Just recently, I wanted to restructure my men, and I was very upset because many of them had been killed in a clash with bandits,” Bawa said, his voice heavy with grief.

Middlemen in the shadows

Muhammadu Abubakar, a gold dealer in Anka, transitioned from artisanal mining to gold trading within a decade. Local dealers like Abubakar are often the first point of contact once gold is extracted and processed. “We weigh the gold and pay the miners. Sometimes, I buy between 10 and 20 grams of gold in a month,” Abubakar said, noting that other dealers may buy more.

Though there is no way of knowing if gold from bandits makes its way into their hands, Abubakar and his colleagues at the Pollo Market insist they never purchased gold from bandits. They, however, admitted that the criminal groups operate through middlemen.

Like many organised criminal networks, bandits rely on intermediaries for smooth operations. These middlemen play a vital, yet shadowy role in gold processing, transportation and sales to the movement and exchange of firearms and ammunition.

In Maru, Zamfara State, an artisanal miner goes into a mining tunnel

But this investigation found that the middlemen involved in the gold trade were often distinct from those operating in the arms trade, even though they were, in most cases, within the same communities and their paths may cross.

To evade detection, middlemen in the gold sector embed themselves within local communities, as explained by Isah and corroborated by other artisanal miners. He said some of them own private gold processing centres and serve as couriers of gold and cash for bandits. His account was re-echoed by Rabiu Bawa, the vigilante commander in Zamfara, who explained that when in need of cash, bandits use agents to transport gold to dealers at Gusau’s Pollo Market.

But the shadowy nature of agents is deeply entrenched in the protection they get from bandits, explained security and intelligence expert,  Kabiru Adamu, who said apart from protecting gold fields, bandits also protect agents to move freely between locations.

Subsequently, to protect their interests and ward off security agents and rivals, bandits require weaponry, said Adamu, who is also the managing director of Beacon Consulting, a renowned firm providing enterprise risks and security management solutions in Nigeria and the Sahel.

READ ALSO: How gold-for-arms trade fuels terror in Nigeria’s North-West (1)

Interactions with personnel from the Nigerian Immigration Service and Customs officers stationed at the Nigeria/Niger border reveal that trafficked weapons coming into the country are mostly tracked through Jibia in Katsina State.

“Jibia is about 40km from Gusau, and if they can come in undetected, the weapons move to parts of Zamfara and other states, especially Kaduna and Niger States,” said an immigration officer who requested anonymity.

The role of middlemen in the sector is driven by the emergence of a war economy, much like the North-East at the height of Boko Haram’s insurgency, explained the Consultant Director of Corporate Affairs and Information Services (DCAIS) at the Nigerian Army Resource Centre (NARC), Abuja, a Brigadier General Sani Kukasheka Usman (rtd), who noted that bandits exploit societal deprivation to smuggle and transport firearms and ammunition.

“Sometimes transporters of arms are recruited consciously or unconsciously,” he said. “Take, for example, someone living in poverty. If you hand them a parcel to deliver, they might not ask questions until they’re arrested,” said Usman, a former director of army public relations, who added that fear forces some to act as intermediaries for bandits.

From gold to guns

Increased demand for weapons among non-state actors has placed Nigeria in the 5th spot on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, trailing behind Burkina Faso, Pakistan, Syria, Mali and Niger. The Sahel region, geographically straddling Nigeria, remains the global terrorism epicentre, accounting for over half of all global terrorism deaths. With competition over the region’s mineral resources, especially gold, contributing to ongoing instability in Mali and Burkina Faso, it not only exposes northern Nigeria to the regional patterns of insecurity but situates Nigeria among key hotspots of violence and arms trafficking, facilitating both importation and domestic production of weapons in West Africa.

In search of gold in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State

No doubt, Nigeria’s porous borders, with about a thousand illegal entry and exit points stemming from Benin Republic, Chad, Niger Republic and Cameroon, remain a critical factor in arms smuggling, said General Usman.

Sources of firearms for bandits

The country’s vulnerability to global insecurity was re-echoed by the then Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Christopher Musa, in July, when he said Nigeria harbours 40 percent of the over 500 million illegal small arms and light weapons circulating in West Africa. He noted that the weapons, smuggled from conflict zones in the Sahel and North Africa, have empowered terrorists, bandits and ethnic militias, escalating violence in northern Nigeria.

However, apart from smuggled firearms, the Nigerian government acknowledges a wide range of weapons used by non-state actors. Speaking on this, Adamu, the intelligence experts, said that though a bulk of the weaponry is smuggled through the land and sea borders, other sources include local manufacturing points where weapons such as the AK-47 are fabricated, as well as those sold by corrupt security officials.

Shedding light on Nigeria’s local weapon manufacturing dynamics, Usman noted that the illegal sector has grown “remarkably innovative, capable of fabricating nearly every type of weapon.”

Therefore, to increase their capacity for violence, bandits rely on foreign and domestic channels for firearms, funded substantially by gold extracted from Nigeria’s informal mining operations. These weapons, Adamu explained, help bandits in protecting mining sites against the Nigerian authority and other rival groups. This also enables them to gain more influence and control.

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One figure who embodied this nexus of illicit gold mining and arms acquisition was slain bandit leader Halilu Sububu. Before he was killed in a military ambush in September 2024, Sububu was described by a Professor of History and International Studies at Usmanu Danfodio University, Sokoto, Murtala Rufai, as a key arms supplier to bandit groups and reportedly controlled mining sites across Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna.

Whether Sububu funnelled gold profits into gun deals or outrightly swapped the metal for weapons remains unclear. What is certain, however, is that since his death, a new player, Kachalla Mati, has stepped in to fill the void.

Isah, who worked under mining sites controlled by Sububu and now under the control of Mati, said bandits often boast of how gold proceeds are used to purchase advanced weaponry, including rocket-propelled grenades.

When questioned about these claims, Mati initially dismissed the inquiry as too sensitive. He later confirmed that proceeds from gold were used for various purchases, including weaponry. “Some firearms could even bring down a plane,” he said and added, “There are African countries where weapons are sold in shops.”

For international weapon transactions, Mati said gold, treated as a foreign currency, is stockpiled over several weeks and then smuggled across borders into Niger or Mali. There, it is sold, and the proceeds are used to buy weapons that are later trafficked back into Nigeria.

Offering a glimpse into how these transactions unfold, he said trade in weapons within Nigeria operates on a cash-based system using Naira. He explained that bandits sell their gold through intermediaries in local markets to raise cash used to acquire firearms either from fellow bandits, gun runners, or local fabricators.

In one instance, Mati recounted how a gun runner from Plateau State was intercepted by security forces while transporting a weapon to his group. Without identifying the type of weapon, he reinforced how middlemen trafficking firearms and ammunition across state lines are typically motivated by upfront deposits, with the rest paid after delivery. “We agreed to pay N1 million, and an advance of N800,000 was paid via POS (Point of Sale), but the driver was arrested,” he said.

In search of gold in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State

Providing perspective into the pricing of AK47, a widely used assault rifle among Nigeria’s security forces and a favourite for non-state actors, he said new foreign versions cost between N5 million and N6 million ($3,266-$3,920) while the locally fabricated versions cost around N500,000 ($326). Mati said bandits equally expand their arsenals from attacks on military and police armouries and ambushes on security forces, noting that such versions of AK47 are sold among bandits, between N500,000 to N1million ($326-$653), depending on their condition.

Ammunition, the bandit leader said, is typically sold in ‘mudu,’ a metal grain measuring bowl popular in Nigeria. A mudu, according to him, costs anywhere between N800,000 and N1.1million ($522-$720), depending on type and market situation.

His insights into the price of a new foreign AK47 rifle are in line with a recent argument by Nigeria’s National Security Adviser (NSA), Nuhu Ribadu, who said the price of the foreign AK47 reached N5 million in 2024, against less than N500,000 in 2023, therefore making the rifle out of reach of bandits.

But Adamu challenges the notion that weapon prices determine their availability, arguing that bandits rely on diverse revenue streams to procure firearms. He blamed the Nigerian government for doing little to curb bandits’ access to weapons and ammunition and warned that attention must shift beyond Libya to include Sudan as a growing source of weaponry.

“Even ammunition is easily accessible to bandits, and this is evident in the way they shoot recklessly,” he said.

Swapping gold for guns

Since 2021, the Nigerian government has responded to the activities of armed banditry with a series of aggressive measures, including military interventions, a sweeping ban on mining activities and a declaration of a ‘no-fly zone’ on Zamfara to halt what it suspected as the swap of gold for arms by bandits. Though this suspicion has lingered for years, no concrete evidence has emerged to confirm how this transaction is conducted and with whom.

Mati, however, gave a glimpse into these transactions, boasting that under Sububu, bandits exchanged gold for arms with partners from Mali and Burkina Faso. He, however, said that since he assumed leadership, he has now established links with firearm dealers from Algeria.

“What we do is to exchange the gold for weapons,” he said. “We will not give them money; we give them the gold and they give us the guns,” Mati clarified, revealing the mechanics of the barter system in which gold is exchanged directly for firearms.

Building on his earlier explanation of black-market firearm pricing, he added that the cost of each firearm is negotiated, and once agreed, gold is exchanged based on its equivalent value as payment for the weapon. Based on this explanation, with high-quality gold selling at ana155,000 per gram at Gusau’s Pollo Market in May, it would require between 33 grams and 39 grams, valued at over N5 million to purchase a new foreign-brand AK-47 rifle. Mati boasts of raking in approximately N300m weekly from his mining operations, that is equivalent to 60 AK-47 rifles from a week’s gold production.

READ ALSO: Insecurity still a major problem despite Nigerian govt’s claims

Explaining further, he said the Algerian partners come with their own gold measuring device, saying, “that one that makes that ‘dit, dit’ sound.”

He explained that once the gold is exchanged, any outstanding balance is settled at a later transaction. During the interview, Mati claimed that the weapons are delivered in batches and in May, noting that about 40 firearms had arrived from Algeria. However, when asked to reveal them, he became suspicious and refused the request.

Artisanal miners and local gold dealers use these tools to measure gold.

Experts agree that the connection between gold and firearms is a driving force behind banditry in Nigeria’s North-West. Adamu explained that though gold mining increases the capacity for bandits to access firearms and ammunition, bandit influence is equally derived from gaps in governance, which they exploit to take over Nigeria’s many ungoverned spaces.

We reached out to the Nigerian government through the National Counter Terrorism Centre, under the office of the National Security Adviser and the National Coordinator, Maj. Gen. AG Laka,

He agreed to an interview but later ignored repeated requests. The Minister of Information, Mohammed Idris Malagi, also did not respond to several interview requests on the findings of this investigation.

Though the Nigerian military is currently conducting an ongoing operation against bandits in the North-West, the spirit to fight for their freedom remains a burning desire among civilians. “If not for their guns, we’d fight back,” said Chairman of artisanal miners in Maganda, Ibrahi, Lawal. As a resident and artisanal gold miner, Lawal understands that every ounce of gold seized by bandits increases their access to firearms and strengthens their grip on communities. “The best way to tackle this,” he said, “is for the government to cut off their access to weapons and take full control of the mining sites.”

Beneath the bloodstained earth of North-West Nigeria, sources say Mati and other bandits continue to wield power over mining fields. However, Isah has since relocated from Dan-kamfani to Giwaye, near Anka town, where he is scraping a living from the soil. “The gold is not much here,” he said, “but it is better than slaving for bandits.”

This investigation was taken from our partner, the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR). It was developed through a mentorship programme with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) and La Cellule Norbert Zongo pour le journalisme d’investigation en Afrique de l’Ouest (CENOZO), as part of the ‘Support to the Mitigation of Destabilising Effects of Transnational Organised Crime (M-TOC)’ project. The M-TOC project is commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) and implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and GI-TOC from 2024 to 2025. This article is totally independent and does not necessarily express the views of GI-TOC, CENOZO, GIZ or GFFO.